DesigningDecision Systems
Models / Lab / System 05

EPA Bargaining Engine

Models Economic Partnership Agreement renegotiation as a sequential bargaining game among an African state, the European Union and the AfCFTA Council. It connects equilibrium analysis to threat testing, sensitivity analysis, concession sequencing and coalition comparison.

Incentive Design and Strategic Interaction8 input groups7 output groups
Launch modelAll models
Decision problem

What the model examines

Which negotiating threats are credible, which concessions should be offered first and how dependent is the recommended position on behavioural and structural assumptions?

Analytical method

How the model is structured

A finite perfect-information game models three actors and solves the sequence by backward induction to a subgame perfect equilibrium. Behavioural terms modify payoffs while a two-condition test determines threat credibility. Sensitivity analysis uses one-dimensional sweeps and a two-dimensional parameter grid.

Interface

What this model is built to test

  • Strategic Brief dashboard
  • Game Tree and Equilibrium view
  • Threat credibility charts
  • One and two-dimensional sensitivity views
  • Concession Sequencing
  • Peer and coalition comparison
  • Data Explorer and Methodology
Inputs

Decision controls

  • Primary and comparison countries
  • Africa and European Union discount factors
  • Behavioural parameters
  • EPA lock-in costs
  • Great-power shadow
  • AfCFTA opportunity
  • Game depth
  • Sensitivity parameters
Outputs

Analytical returns

  • Solved equilibrium and path
  • Extensive-form game tree
  • Threat credibility scores
  • Single and paired parameter sensitivity
  • Ranked concession sequence
  • Peer bargaining and coalition comparison
  • Browsable and exportable datasets
Fields of inquiry
Incentive Design and Strategic InteractionEconomic Statecraft, Trade and CoercionInstitutional and Legal DesignRisk, Uncertainty and Forecasting

Related models

Shared analytical fields
System 01Economic Statecraft, Trade and Coercion

African Strategic Leverage & Commodity Control Lab

How can African producer states convert commodity endowments into durable bargaining power while limiting the risks created by restrictive or interventionist policy?

Inspect model
System 02Decision Science and Behavioural Design

Choice Architecture Studio

How can a choice environment be redesigned when a single intervention produces uneven or counterproductive effects across different people?

Inspect model
System 03Economic Statecraft, Trade and Coercion

Coercion Resilience Mapper

Which commodity corridors create concentrated exposure to external pressure and which countermeasures restore strategic position at an acceptable cost?

Inspect model